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The Perfect Family: Decision Making in Biparental Care
Abstract
Background
Previous theoretical work on parental decisions in biparental care has emphasized the role of the conflict
between evolutionary interests of parents in these decisions. A prominent prediction from this work is that
parents should compensate for decreases in each other's effort, but only partially so. However, experimental
tests that manipulate parents and measure their responses fail to confirm this prediction. At the same time, the
process of parental decision making has remained unexplored theoretically. We develop a model to address
the discrepancy between experiments and the theoretical prediction, and explore how assuming different
decision making processes changes the prediction from the theory.
Model Description
We assume that parents make decisions in behavioral time. They have a fixed time budget, and allocate it
between two parental tasks: provisioning the offspring and defending the nest. The proximate determinant of
the allocation decisions are parents' behavioral objectives. We assume both parents aim to maximize the
offspring production from the nest. Experimental manipulations change the shape of the nest production
function. We consider two different scenarios for how parents make decisions: one where parents
communicate with each other and act together (the perfect family), and one where they do not communicate,
and act independently (the almost perfect family).
Conclusions/Significance
The perfect family model is able to generate all the types of responses seen in experimental studies. The kind
of response predicted depends on the nest production function, i.e. how parents' allocations affect offspring
production, and the type of experimental manipulation. In particular, we find that complementarity of
parents' allocations promotes matching responses. In contrast, the relative responses do not depend on the
type of manipulation in the almost perfect family model. These results highlight the importance of the
interaction between nest production function and how parents make decisions, factors that have largely been
overlooked in previous models.
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Introduction
The study of parental care is one of the most prominent areas in
behavioral ecology. A large number of empirical and theoretical
studies have been published attempting to explain patterns of
parental care in terms of the fitness costs and benefits to the
individuals supplying it [1]. These fitness costs and benefits are
usually studied in the framework of sexual conflict, which posits
that behavioral interactions between breeding males and females
are driven by the conflicts between their evolutionary interests.
Currently, the common wisdom seems to be that ‘‘the evolution of
parental care is riddled with sexual conflict and a resulting
evolutionary tug-of-war between males and females’’ [2, p. 156].
The most prominent prediction from this line of work is called
partial compensation, and means that when parents respond to
loss of effort by their partners, they should only do so partially.
However, this prediction has had only mixed success in empirical
tests. At the same time, theoretical work on the issue of how caring
parents make their decisions in a social context remains scarce. In
this paper, we aim to address these two issues. Our approach is to
analyze the behavioral decisions made by parents under two
different models of how they make decisions. We show that these
two models yield a variety of predictions as a function of the
ecology of nest production, which can explain the observed
variation in experimental tests of the partial compensation
prediction. Moreover, the two models also yield strikingly different
response patterns to different model experiments, which allow
empirically distinguishing between them. Below, we start by an
overview of previous theory and its central prediction.
Overview of previous theory
The central concept in parental care theory is parental
investment (PI). Trivers [3] defined PI as any investment in an
offspring that benefits that particular offspring, but prevents the
parent from investing in other offspring. This definition is logically
self-consistent as it defines PI in the relevant currency, namely
offspring produced. However, it also makes PI a complicated
variable that depends on population-level patterns of care and
demography because these determine the opportunities to invest in
other offspring [4]. Consequently, PI in Trivers’ sense is hard to
measure, and most empirical and theoretical studies focused on a
different variable, parental effort (PE), defined as the material
resources (such as time or energy) invested in or risks taken during
parental care [5,6].
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A major question in parental care theory is what amount of PE
should be invested by each parent in a biparental species (e.g. most
birds). Since the 1970’s, several models have been built to answer this
question [5,7–11]. In all these models, parents face a trade-off between
investing time and energy into their current broods versus investing
into their own survival or remating effort in order to gain other
reproductive opportunities. These alternative reproductive opportuni-
ties are the cause of the conflict between parents’ fitness interests. (In the
special case of complete genetic monogamy for the lifetime of both
parents, this conflict disappears, but this is generally regarded as a rare
and derived case.) The fitness functions that result from this trade-off
are then analyzed to find the stable levels of PE. There are different
flavors to the different models: the one by Chase [8] is purely
behavioral, and assumes that individuals reach optimal PE by reacting
to each others PE behaviorally. Later, the analysis of Houston and
Davies [9] modifies this assumption and allows the interpretation that
individuals’ PE are genetically determined. Finally, McNamara et al.
[10] stipulate that individuals react to each other in behavioral time
according to some genetically determined response rules, and attempt
to calculate the evolutionary stable response rules. More recently, this
model has been extended by Johnstone and Hinde [11] to include the
possibility of imperfect information.
Despite the differences in how they treat the decision making by
the parents, all of these models (except [11]) yield a common
prediction. If parents are allowed to respond to each other
behaviorally (as opposed to their efforts being genetically fixed), they
should do so in a particular manner. Namely, if one of the parents
decreases its effort, the other parent should increase effort in return,
but by a smaller amount then the original decrease. This type of
response is called partial compensation. To see the intuition behind this
prediction, consider what would happen if the responding parent
compensated fully for the loss of effort by its partner: the brood would
then continue receiving the same level of total care. This means that
the parent decreasing its effort does not experience a fitness reduction
in the current reproductive success, while it benefits from the
increased survival (or remating) chances. Consequently, that parent
will enjoy higher fitness and will be selected to reduce its effort. The
exception to this prediction is the model by Johnstone and Hinde
[11], who predict response rules with positive slopes, i.e. a matching
response, under some parameter regimes. The reason behind their
prediction is that in their model, parents operate under uncertainty
about the brood’s real need. Therefore, changes in partner effort also
convey information about changes in the brood’s need, which under
some conditions elicits a matching response. The relation between
Johnstone and Hinde’s model and the current one is taken up in more
detail in the Discussion.
Empirical tests
A number of empirical studies in birds have tested the prediction of
partial compensation, this literature has been reviewed recently by
Hinde [12]. The most common methods involve handicapping one of
the parents by attaching small weights to their tails [13] or clipping
some tail feathers [14]. The handicapped parent commonly (but not
always, e.g. [15]) decreases the frequency of the food deliveries it
makes to the nest, which is taken to be a measure of PE. The partner
is then predicted to compensate partially by increasing its food
delivery rate, but not as much as the original reduction by the
handicapped parent. However, the results of these experiments show
considerable variation, including no compensation (house sparrows,
[16]), partial compensation (orange-tufted sunbird, [17]) and full
compensation (great tits, [15]). Of the 10 handicapping studies that
Hinde reviews 5 show no compensation, 2 partial compensation, and
3 full compensation. In the same article, Hinde reports on her own
study that instead of handicapping one parent, simulated begging
calls by nestlings in great tits. In this case, parents show a matching
response, meaning that both of them adjust their provisioning rates in
the same direction [12]. The contrast between the prominent partial
compensation prediction from previous theory and the observed
variation in empirical results motivates our model.
A new approach
In this article, we develop a different approach to the question of
how parents should respond to manipulations. There are two
major sets of assumptions we make in our model. The first set
concerns the ecology of parental care and how it affects the
production of offspring from the nest. We assume that the nest
production is dependent not only on the total PE, but also on the
allocation of that effort between two competing parental tasks,
which we take to be nest defense (or vigilance) and food delivery.
We measure PE as the total time spent on care. Thus, parents
need to allocate their time optimally between two tasks. Almost all
previous manipulation studies have measured only one parental
care component, provisioning, and equated changes in provision-
ing to changes in total PE. The exception to this trend is the study
by Markman et al. [17], which measures both time spent
provisioning and time spent on nest guarding, and documents a
trade-off between these two. Here, we model a situation where
changes in provisioning in response to manipulations can be
explained by changes in allocation of PE.
We also incorporate explicitly the nature of the experimental
manipulation into our model when predicting parents’ responses.
The nature of the manipulations turns out to be decisive in
determining how parents respond to manipulations, but has
largely been overlooked in previous models. There is again, one
exception to this trend, which is the model by Sanz et al. [15],
which explicitly incorporates two types of possible manipulations
into their predictive framework.
The second set of assumptions concerns how parents make
decisions. Our model operates at the behavioral, as opposed to
evolutionary, time-scale. That is, we model parents that adjust
their parental care decisions dynamically in response to changes in
the environment, similar to Chase [8]. Parents’ decisions affect
how much the chicks grow and how likely they are to survive, and
how much energy reserves the parent has left. These factors result
in a fitness accumulation rate from the nest for each parent, which
can then be incorporated in a demographic equation for natural
selection. We then assume that parents have objective functions
that they aim to maximize by behaviorally adjusting their
allocations. These objective functions are proximate causes of
allocation decisions, distinct from evolutionary fitness, which
represented by the fitness accumulation rate. The notion of
behavioral goals and objectives, as distinct from an individual’s
fitness, has been an integral part of ethology for a long time (e.g.
[18]) but has lost its prominence in modern behavioral ecology.
Our analysis re-emphasizes behavioral objectives as proximate
causes for individuals’ actions. We conjecture that it is these
behavioral objectives that are evolved traits of individuals, rather
than any specific PE or allocation decision. This follows the
argument by Roughgarden et al. [19], who proposed that
behavioral decisions should be modeled at the behavioral time-
scale, which in turn is to be embedded in an overarching
evolutionary genetics tier.
Recently, Akçay et al. [20] have developed a general framework
for finding evolutionarily stable behavioral objectives. Shortly, their
framework considers an interaction where each individual acts as to
maximize a certain objective (for example, its own payoff). These
objectives lead to a within-generation behavioral dynamics that then
arrive at a certain set of actions at the equilibrium, where individuals
The Perfect Family
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locally maximize their own objectives. The payoffs from the
behavioral equilibrium are then taken as the fitness of the
individuals. Then, a mutant with a different objective function
than the resident is introduced, and its fitness is calculated using the
new behavioral dynamics that ensue. In this manner, they derive
equations for behavioral objectives that are evolutionarily stable, i.e.
cannot be invaded by any mutant.
In this paper, we skip this evolutionary analysis, and instead aim
to produce a predictive framework for parental manipulation
experiments, which exclusively take place in the behavioral time
scale. For that, we need to specify what the evolved objectives of
parents might be. Here, we assume that both parents aim to
maximize the number of offspring fledged from the nest, which we
call the nest production. This choice means that parents objectives
are concordant, at least at the time-scale of manipulations. There
are three independent motivations for this choice. The first
motivation is intuitive: nest production is a simple and measurable
measure of parental success, and is undoubtedly a major, if not the
sole determinant of parental decisions at the behavioral scale we
consider in our model. The second motivation comes from the
results of Akçay et al. [20], who show that in games where players
have conflicting payoff interests, efficient outcomes (i.e. ones upon
which it is not possible to improve both players’ payoffs) can be
achieved only if parents’ objectives are locally concordant at the
behavioral equilibrium. In finite populations, only efficient
outcomes are long-term evolutionarily stable [21,22], which
implies that evolution can frequently lead to objectives that are
concordant (see Discussion for more on this). Finally, the third
motivation for this choice is methodological; we are interested in
asking what predictions parents having concordant objectives leads
to, and whether this case can account for the observed in empirical
studies. In general, the objective functions can also engender some
conflict between parents, and the case we consider can be viewed
as a null-model to compare the conflict model with.
A second question we are interested in is whether parents act
jointly, meaning that they communicate about factors affecting
their decisions and decide on their allocations together, or whether
they act independently from each other. This question is different
than whether parents have common objectives. Even in the case
where both parents aim to maximize offspring production from
the nest, they might still face uncertainty about what the optimal
allocation is. Parents might have different information about
factors such as the brood’s hunger level, temperature, or predation
pressure, which will affect what their perception of the optimal
time allocation. This is an important consideration for manipu-
lation experiments: if one of the parents is manipulated while the
other is not, the manipulated parent will experience a different
environment than the non-manipulated parent. We model two
ways in which the parents might arrive at their allocations. One is
where parents communicate with each other, agree on a common
picture of the environment, and act accordingly. In this case, they
will maximize the same nest production function, which we label
‘‘the perfect family,’’ corresponding to the most harmonious state
of affairs between parents. The second way is one where each
parent decides its allocation individually, according to its own
information about the environment. This we call the ‘‘almost
perfect family:’’ even though parents have the same objectives,
they do not actually work together to achieve it.
In the next section we describe our model and the analysis
method we use for the two different scenarios of how parents
decide on their allocations. We then present the conditions under
which parents should compensate for changes in each other’s
allocation in response to manipulations under the two scenarios.
We end with a discussion of the assumptions of our model as well
as how to distinguish between the two different decision making
scenarios in our model.
Analysis
Imagine two parent birds at a nest that must allocate time
between two competing parental activities, say, nest defense and
offspring provisioning. Parents adjust their allocations dynamically
in a short time frame (e.g. minutes or hours) to maximize offspring
production from the nest. When deciding on their allocations,
parents face a budget constraint: they each have a fixed time
allocated for parental activities, which we denote by Tm and Tf for
the male and the female, respectively. The time budgets Tm and
Tf are in effect measures of total PE. We regard the time budgets
as constants at the time-scale of the responses to manipulations,
meaning that parents cannot increase their allocation to both
provisioning and defense at the same time. This situation can arise
from at least two different scenarios: (i) the time budgets might be
genetically determined, similar to the parental effort variables in
the model of Houston and Davies [9], or (ii) time budgets do
change as in the model of McNamara et al. [10], but at slower
time-scales than the responses to the manipulation. We do not
model how the time budgets are determined, but in both of these
scenarios, parents would experience the trade-off between parental
effort and personal survival that is found in previous models, which
would prevent the time budgets being arbitrarily large (see also
Discussion).
The time allocated by the parents to offspring provisioning is
denoted by xm and xf , and the allocation to nest defense by ym
and yf (the subscripts m and f are for the male and the female,
respectively), with xmzym~Tm and xf zyf ~Tf . The production
from the nest is the number of offspring surviving to the next
breeding season. This varies as a function of the time allocated to
defense and provisioning and is denoted by R xm,xf ,ym,yf
 
. The
nest production function will in general depend on a number of
factors, including brood size, the developmental stage of the
chicks, environmental variables, etc. Here, we are interested in
short-term responses of parents to experimental manipulations,
rather than the complete trajectories of their allocations, and
therefore we assume that everything that affects the nest
production function stays constant, except for the experimental
manipulation. To reflect the dependence of nest production on
both provisioning and nest defense, R can be written as the
product of two functions:
R xm,xf ,ym,yf
 
~g xm,xf
 
s ym,yf
 
,
where g and s denote the growth rate and the survival rate of the
brood as a result of parents’ times spent provisioning and
defending. Such a nest production function would arise when
overwinter survival of juveniles is a function of the mass at
fledgling (proportional to the growth rate g), and the survival to
fledgling is a function of nest predation. In this paper, we treat the
nest production function R as exogenously specified and derive the
responses of parents as a function of the function’s shape. This
approach can be complemented with a mechanistic one that
derives the nest production function from the specific breeding
ecology of a species and thus relates the responses of the parents to
particular biological or environmental factors, such as tempera-
ture, food availability or predation pressure.
An individual’s time allocation decision can only be based on
the information it has. Therefore, the function R needs to be
interpreted from the individual parent’s perspective, as its perception
of how the nest production depends on their allocations. Parents’
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perceptions of the nest production might differ from each other,
and the real production function, depending on the information
they possess about environmental factors (such as predation risk)
and individual traits (such as effectiveness in foraging) that affect
breeding success.
The perfect family
For the perfect family case, we assume that parents communi-
cate and arrive at a shared function R. The optimal allocation
problem is then to maximize a single function R with respect to
both parents’ time allocations, subject to the budget constraints.
There are two possible types of solutions: an interior solution
meaning that both parents spend some time doing both tasks
(0vxmvTm and 0vxf vTf ), or a boundary solution where at
least one of the parents devotes its time exclusively to a single task.
Both parents spending their entire time budget doing different
tasks corresponds to a complete division of labor. Evidence from
birds with biparental care suggests that this is rare, so we focus
mainly on interior solutions to the optimal allocation problem.
The interior solutions can be found by taking the total derivative of
R with respect to xm and xf and setting it equal to zero:
dR
dxm
:
LR
Lxm
z
LR
Lym
dym
dxm
~
LR
Lxm
{
LR
Lym
~0 ð1Þ
dR
dxf
:
LR
Lxf
z
LR
Lyf
dyf
dxf
~
LR
Lxf
{
LR
Lyf
~0 ð2Þ
Here, we have incorporated the budget constraints into the first
order conditions directly, by setting
dym
dxm
~
dyf
dxf
~{1. We denote
the optimal allocation by the parents that solve equations (1) and
(2) by xm,x

f
 
, subject to second order conditions that ensure that
the critical point is in fact a maximum, and that this maximum is a
stable equilibrium of the behavioral dynamics following these
objective functions [20]. For a discussion of behavioral stability
under a different, discrete-time dynamics scenario, see [23].
The almost perfect family
For the almost perfect family case, one needs to modify the first
order conditions above. We now have two nest production
functions, Rm and Rf , standing for the male’s and female’s
perceptions of the nest production. This is because parents do not
communicate with each other and therefore optimize with respect
to their own perception of the nest production function. The first
order conditions are then:
dRm
dxm
~
LRm
Lxm
{
LRm
Lym
~0 ð3Þ
dRf
dxf
~
LRf
Lxf
{
LRf
Lyf
~0 ð4Þ
Results
Responses of parents to manipulations
In order for parents to change their allocations in response to an
experimental manipulation, some aspect of the production
function must change. For example, handicapping one of the
parents might reduce how much that parent’s time allocation to
provisioning increases offspring survival, but leave other aspects of
the production function unchanged. Alternatively, a begging call
playback [12] might change the parents’ perception of brood need,
again amounting to altering (the perception of) how the time
allocated to provisioning affects offspring growth. To express this
mathematically, we introduce a parameter, a, that modulates the
shape of the nest production function. This parameter represents
some property of the environment or of a parent that has an effect
on how time allocations translate into offspring production. An
experimental manipulation can then be represented as a change in
a. For example, handicapping the female can be represented by
multiplying its foraging time xf , by a term 1{að Þv1 in the
growth function g, corresponding to a decrease in food brought to
nest per unit time spent foraging. Increasing a means more severe
handicapping of the female. This example and an additional one is
discussed further below.
The perfect family
We want to calculate the change in parents’ optimal allocations
with a, i.e.
dxm
da
and
dxf
da
. The ratio of these two derivatives, which
we call the relative response ratio and denote by r, gives us how
parents’ optimal allocations change relative to each other. Thus,
we have:
r~
dxm
dxf
~
dxm
da

dxf
da
ð5Þ
Almost all of the experimental studies measure only the food
delivery to the nest, which corresponds to the allocation to
provisioning in our model. Therefore, the quantity r is what needs
to be compared to experimental results.
Suppose the female is the manipulated parent. We can classify
the different types of responses of the parents according to the sign
and magnitude of the relative response ratio. Partial compensation
occurs when the male and female adjust their allocations in
opposite directions, but the male in a smaller magnitude than the
female, i.e.:
{1vrv0 ð6Þ
Similarly, overcompensation and matching are characterized by
rv{1 and rw0, respectively.
To obtain the relative response ratio, we take the total derivative
of equations (1) and (2) with respect to the experimental
manipulation parameter a, and solve the resulting two equations
for
dxm
da
and
dxf
da
. In this way, we obtain for the relative response
ratio:
r~
L
La
dR
dxm
 
d2R
dx2f
{
L
La
dR
dxf
 
d2R
dxf dxm
L
La
dR
dxf
 
d2R
dx2m
{
L
La
dR
dxm
 
d2R
dxf dxm
, ð7Þ
Note that this expression contains mixed derivatives of R with
respect to xm and xf , and a which means that the relative
responses of the parents depend on how changing the value of a (in
other words, the experimental manipulation) affects the sensitivity
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of the production function to the time allocations of the male and
the female. Given a particular nest production function, the right-
hand side of equation (7) evaluated at the optimum allocations,
gives r as a function of the experimental manipulation parameter
a. Note that r describes the relative changes in xm and xf . As such,
we are not interested in the change in r itself, rather, we want to
know the value of r at a particular (non-manipulated) value of a.
(Note that we assume an infinitesimal change in the parameter a;
for real manipulations, the change in a will be finite, so we would
need to deal with differences rather than derivatives.)
We distinguish between two types of manipulations that are
representative of the possible range. In the first one, the
manipulation decreases the contribution of the female’s provision-
ing effort, xf , to the production function, i.e.
L
La
dR
dxf
v0, while
increasing the contribution of the male’s provisioning effort, xm,
i.e.
L
La
dR
dxm
w0. Such an effect would be produced by handicap-
ping manipulations that decrease the female’s ability to find food
and with it the amount of food delivered per unit time spent
foraging by the female, which increases the importance of the food
that the male brings in. Thus, we call this type of experimental
treatments handicap manipulations. The second type of manipulation
is characterized by
L
La
dR
dxm
w0 and
L
La
dR
dxf
w0, which would be
the case when the real or perceived provisioning need of the brood
is manipulated by, for example, food deprivation or playing
begging calls to parents. We call such experimental treatments need
manipulations. An example nest production function and two
instances of manipulations that affect it in different ways are
given below.
Conditions for compensation in the perfect family
We focus on the conditions for a compensation response, i.e. the
right-hand inequality in condition (6). This analysis is illustrative of
the general pattern, namely that all three types of relative response
ratios are possible, depending on the shape of the nest production
function and the type of manipulation. Conditions for other types
of responses can be found in a similar fashion.
The right-hand inequality in condition (6) is satisfied when the
numerator and the denominator on the right hand-side of (7) have
opposite signs. For handicap manipulations, a sufficient condition
for a compensation response is that
d2R
dxf dxm
v0 : ð8Þ
The mixed derivative of the production function with respect to
its two inputs has an important meaning in economics. It
measures whether the inputs are substitutes or complements for
each other. If the mixed derivative is negative, that means that an
increase in one of the inputs decreases the marginal value of the
other input; such inputs are called substitutes. In our case,
condition (8) says that the male and female both can substitute for
changes in each other’s allocation. It is easy to show that this will
be the case when xm and xf , and ym and yf are substitutes for
each other in the foraging and defense functions g and s,
respectively. (In our notation,
L2g
LxmLxf
v0 and
L2s
LymLyf
v0.) In
many bird species, we expect this to be true because both parents
are usually capable of both provisioning and defense and thus
one’s effort can be substituted for the other’s. On the other hand,
a positive mixed derivative of g can come about when the
overwinter survival is an accelerating function of the total food
delivered. This can happen, for example, when there is some
baseline level of food provisioning required for the basal
metabolism of the nestlings, and anything above the baseline
contributes to increased survival after fledging. This would make
L2g
LxmLxf
w0, which enables a matching response. A similar
argument can be made for the survival p as a function of total
time allocated to nest defense.
The situation changes under a need manipulation. Then,
condition (8) no longer guarantees compensation, but it is a
necessary condition for compensation. This means that even if the
parents’ allocations are substitutes for each other, the optimal
response to a need manipulation can be in the same direction for
both. Conversely, the inverse of inequality (8) guarantees a
matching response. The implication of this change in the necessary
and sufficient conditions mean that for some nest production
functions, different types of manipulations can produce strikingly
different types of relative responses.
An example
We illustrate the differences in the relative response ratio
predicted under two different types of manipulations with a
specific nest production. We use the following functions for the
provisioning and nest defense components, respectively:
g xf ,xm
 
~ xmzxf {
1
2
xmzxf
 2
s yf ,ym
 
~
ymzyf zymyf
 
3
These functions are not meant to be realistic descriptions of the
components of a nest production function. Rather, they are simple
functions that incorporate the generally expected properties of a
nest production function. The provisioning function g (similar
form to the one used in [11]) increases with the sum of the parents’
allocation, and displays diminishing returns from total time
allocated to provisioning. The survival function s increases linearly
with each parent’s defense allocation and is scaled such that it is
always between zero and one. The term ymyf in the survival
function both ensures that we have an internal solution to the
optimization problem and also captures an aspect of defense
behavior we do not explicitly model here. Generally, nestling
survival will depend not only the amount of time spent on defense,
but also the timing of the defense. For example, if both parents
need to be present and defending the nest for effectively mobbing
some nest predators. If parents do not coordinate their defense
bouts, they would be together at the nest a fraction ymyf of the
time, hence the product term.
To represent the two different types of manipulation, we
parametrize the provisioning function in two different ways. For
a handicap manipulation, we multiply xf in g by a factor 1{hð Þ,
h being the experimentally manipulated parameter. Increasing
h can be thought of as handicapping the female, so that it brings
in less food per time spend foraging. This would decrease the
contribution of female’s provisioning allocation to the growth
rate of the offspring. We assume for simplicity that the handicap
on a female does not affect the contribution of her defense to the
survival function s. In reality, a handicap is likely to affect both
the g and s components of the nest production function. In such
cases, experimental manipulation might not satisfy the part of
The Perfect Family
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our definition of the handicap manipulation that stipulates
L
La
dR
dxf
v0. In general, one would need to verify that the effect of
the manipulation on the provisioning function is sufficiently
greater than the effect on the survival function, to satisfy this
condition.
To model a need manipulation, we multiply the sum xmzxf in g
with a number n (w0). Increasing n results in an increase in the slope
of the provisioning function as a function of the total allocation to
provisioning, as well as shifting its maximum towards higher
provisioning efforts. Both of these effects correspond to an increase
in the need (or potential to grow) of the brood [11], since a more
hungry brood can ingest more food, and will benefit more from food
received. The parameters h and n are two different instances of the
generic experimental manipulation parameter a in equation (7).
Figure 1 shows how parents’ allocations behave in the two
manipulations. At h~0 and n~1, both parameterizations give
production functions R identical to each other. However, despite
starting from the same point, handicapping the female (going right on
Figure 1A) produces a partial compensation response, whereas
increasing the need of the brood (going right on Figure 1B) results in a
matching response. This is because in the handicap manipulation
(Figure 1A), the overall need of the brood is not affected directly,
while the female becomes less efficient in provisioning, so that the
optimum allocation of the pair shifts towards the male shouldering
more of the provisioning and the female more of the defense. In
contrast, the need manipulation (Figure 1B) increases the overall need
of the brood so that overall, provisioning becomes more important
relative to defense, causing a shift in both parents’ allocations towards
more provisioning. Figures 1C and 1D further illustrate the responses
by plotting the relative response ratio, r. In the handicap
manipulation (Figure 1C), r is negative and switches from
overcompensation (rv{1) to partial compensation. In contrast, in
the need manipulation, parents match each other’s changes, resulting
in a positive r. Thus, the perfect family behaves in radically different
ways in response to different types of manipulations.
The ‘‘almost perfect’’ family
The analysis in this case is similar to the perfect family case, but
the fact that parents optimize individually with respect to their
own perceptions of nest production changes the result markedly.
Denoting the male’s perception by Rm and the female’s by Rf , we
Figure 1. Response of the parents in the perfect family. Panels A and C are for a handicap manipulation; Panel A depicts parents’ optimal
allocations to foraging, xm (solid line) and xf (dashed line), as well as total time spent foraging by the pair (dotted line) as a function of the handicap
manipulation parameter, h. Panel C, on the other hand, plots the relative response ratio r, i.e. the ratio of the derivatives of xm and xf with respect to
h. Note that in Panel A, xm and xf change in opposite directions; accordingly, rho is negative over the range plotted here. Panels B and D depict the
same for a need manipulation with the need manipulation parameter n. In Panel B, xm and xf coincide; accordingly, the ratio of their derivatives is
constant and equal to 1, corresponding to a matching response. The dotted vertical line in Panels C and D mark the non-manipulated nests for the
two experiments; the sign of the relative response ratios r at these points differ between the two types of manipulations. The fact that r is constant
and equal to 1 in Panel D is caused by the symmetry between the male and the female, and is not a generic feature of the perfect family model. If
males and females are different in some respect, r will be different than 1, and will vary.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007345.g001
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again assume that the female is manipulated. As above, Rf is a
function of xm, xf and the manipulated parameter, a, but now the
male is not manipulated and parents do not exchange information.
Therefore, the male does not see a change in a, and Rm has no
explicit a-dependency. Taking the total derivative of the first order
condition (3) for the male’s allocation with respect to a, we get:
d2Rm
dx2m
dxm
da
z
d2Rm
dxmdxf
dxf
da
z
L
La
dRm
dxm
~0 ð9Þ
Now, the last term in this equation is zero, since Rm does not
depend on a explicitly. Hence we can solve for the relative
response ratio r from this equation alone:
r~{
d2Rm
dxf Lxm
d2Rm
dx2m
ð10Þ
Thus, the relative response ratio in the almost perfect family only
depends on Rm, and not on how changes in a affect the female.
(Note that we chose the female as the manipulated parent by
convention only; if the male were to be manipulated, r would
depend only on Rf .) The reason is simple: since the male does not
see the manipulation, it cannot react to it directly. Therefore, the
male reacts to the only change it can see, which is the change in
female’s allocation, xf . This is why we are able to compute the
relative response ratio r using only the male’s first-order
optimization equation, whereas we needed both first-order
conditions in the perfect family case. Different manipulations will
affect the absolute responses of the parents (i.e.
dxm
da
and
dxf
da
), and
we can compute both those using both first order conditions.
However, the ratio of the absolute responses, r, is constant, and
independent from how the manipulation changes Rf .
Looking at the condition for compensation (rv0), we find that
the necessary and sufficient condition is now:
d2Rm
dxf Lxm
v0 , ð11Þ
since the second order condition for optimization ensures that the
denominator in (10) is negative. Figure 2 depicts the response of an
almost perfect family to the same manipulations described above.
One can discern immediately that the almost perfect family
respond differently than the perfect family. Whereas the perfect
family exhibited either compensation or matching responses
depending on the manipulation, the almost perfect family only
Figure 2. Response of the parents in the almost perfect family. Panels A and C are again for a handicap manipulation, and Panels B and D are
for the need manipulation. Legend same as in Figure 1. The main difference here is that the almost perfect family condition predicts partial
compensation in both cases. At the non-manipulated baseline marked with the dotted line, the relative response r has the same value for both types
of manipulations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007345.g002
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exhibits a compensation response. For the handicap manipulation
(Figure 2A), the female reduces its allocation to foraging, while the
male compensates for this reduction. For the need manipulation
(Figure 2B), the female increases its allocation to foraging, and the
male compensates again, reducing its allocation to foraging.
Figures 2C and 2D again depict the relative response ratio r: even
though the shift of a given parent’s allocation is in opposite
directions for the two different manipulations, the relative response
ratio is negative for both, and has the same value at the non-
manipulated nest for the two manipulations. This feature of the
almost perfect family is in stark contrast with the perfect family,
where the relative response ratios under the different manipula-
tions have opposite signs. This difference can be used to
empirically distinguish between the perfect and almost perfect
family cases (see Discussion).
Discussion
Our aim in this paper is to present a simple model that can
explain results from a number of manipulation experiments that
fail to confirm the partial compensation response from earlier
theory. Our explanation rests on the fact that empirical studies
have mostly focused on only one component of parental care,
provisioning of the offspring. However, breeding animals com-
monly face a trade-off between multiple tasks required for
successful breeding [24]. Given such a trade-off, empirical studies
that only focus on one component would not measure the total PE,
and changes in the measured component due to manipulations do
not necessarily imply changes in the total PE. To our knowledge,
there is only one manipulation study that has measured time-
budgets of parents and tracked how allocation to different tasks has
changed. Markman et al. [17] found that handicapping female
orange-tufted sunbirds (Nectarinia osea) reduced their nest-visiting
rate, to which their partners responded by increasing theirs. While
doing so, the males reduced the time they spend guarding the nest,
indicating a trade-off between these two tasks. Future studies need
to quantify time allocation of individuals to different parental tasks
in order to gain a more complete picture of parents’ responses to
manipulations.
Another implication of our model is that the ecological
determinants of nest production, reflected in the nest production
function R, play a decisive role in determining how parents
respond to manipulations. In particular, a nest production
function where both parents can substitute for each other in both
tasks tends to produce compensation type responses. On the other
hand, when parents’ allocations are complementary, matching
responses become more likely. Thus, different species can exhibit
different responses, depending on the details of their breeding
ecology and the nest production function it results in. Similarly,
how the manipulation actually affects the nest production also
changes the results dramatically, possibly reversing the sign of the
relative response ratio r in the perfect family case (see below).
With this model, we also aimed to explore the process by which
parents make their allocation decisions. Specifically, we modeled
parents’ responses as resulting from a behavioral objective
function. We assumed that the behavioral objectives of the parents
are entirely concordant, with both aiming to maximize nest
production. This assumption can be viewed from three different
perspectives. First, it can be seen as an empirical proposition: as
detailed above, our model can be tested by quantifying the nest
production function and comparing parents’ responses to the
prediction of our model. To model the responses of parents when
they have a mix of common and private interests is beyond the
scope of this paper, but would follow the same methodology as
here. It is possible to build both perfect family (with communi-
cation) and almost perfect family (without communication) type
models for the non-concordant objectives case as well. These
models would yield expressions for the relative response ratio that
depend on the private interests of the parents as well as their
common interest in the nest production. Thus, testing the role of
private and conflicting interests in the responses of parents to
manipulations will likely require experimental methodologies that
affect potential private interests separately from the nest
production function.
The second perspective is to view our assumption as
highlighting the theoretical possibility of parents having concor-
dant objectives. Such a claim is at odds with the widely accepted
notion that parents are in conflict with each other over parental
decisions [25], and one might wonder how it can be justified. The
key to answering this question is to note that in our model,
behavioral objectives are proximate mechanisms for behavior, and
are conjectured to evolve according to their fitness consequences,
as proposed by Roughgarden et al. [19]. Even though behavioral
objectives evolve to maximize fitness benefits to the individuals,
they do not need to directly represent the fitness function.
Whenever there is no lifetime genetic monogamy, evolutionary
interests of parents will differ from each other, and may be in
conflict. However, concordant objectives can result in positive
behavioral feedbacks in parents’ actions, which would lead both of
them to invest more in acts that benefit each other, and both have
higher fitness as a result. Recently, André and Day [21] analyzed
the linear response rule model of McNamara et al. [10], and found
that in finite populations, only efficient outcomes (i.e. ones upon
which it is not possible to improve both individuals’ payoffs
simultaneously) can be evolutionarily stable. This finding is
corroborated by Dekel et al. [22], who find that if the utility
functions of individuals who play a non-cooperative game are
allowed to evolve in a finite population, evolutionarily stable
outcomes have to be efficient. Finally, Akçay et al. [20] show that
efficient outcomes in a game with payoff conflict imply locally
concordant objectives at the outcome. The combination of these
results imply that evolution in finite populations should frequently
lead to concordant objectives.
Finally, the third perspective is that conflict over total PE can
also co-exist with concordant objectives at the nest. We do not
model how parents determine their time budgets, which is the
measure of total PE in our model. The fitness trade-off between PE
and alternative reproductive opportunities that is the hallmark of
sexual conflict models will be present at the determination of the
time budgets, and can lead to conflict of interests. This conflict
may well not be resolved. However, given a pair of time budgets,
both individuals are interested in maximizing the returns from
their time investment. Thus, even though parents might be in
conflict over time budgets, they should have concordant interests
while allocating their time budget for maximum nest production.
We also note that we did not model potential conflicts between
parents relating to hatching asynchrony [26] and differential
investment in individual offspring [27]. An interesting question for
future work is how the potentially different modes of decision
making at the seasonal versus daily time-scales, as well as brood-
level decisions versus decisions related to individual offspring
interact with each other.
It is worth emphasizing again that these perspectives are not
meant to imply that our model disproves the parents-in-conflict
view. Our point is simply that there are strong theoretical and
empirical reasons to devote close attention to the issue and the
possibility of concordant objectives.
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The perfect vs. almost perfect family
Distinct from the question of the objectives driving parents’
decisions is how parents with given objectives decide on their time
allocations. In particular, we distinguish between the perfect and
the almost perfect family models. In the almost perfect family
model, parents do not communicate with each other except
through changing their allocations. In contrast, the perfect family
model allows for direct communication between parents about the
manipulation itself. This leads to qualitatively different relative
response regimes, since the optimal response to a manipulation of
the brood’s need is different than that to a handicap manipulation,
and both parents can discern which is needed. Our model points
out how these two cases can be distinguished from each other
empirically.
In the perfect family, the relative response ratio of the parents
can be positive, or negative, depending on the type of
manipulation. In contrast, parents that do not communicate with
each other when making allocation decisions will show the same
relative response, regardless of the type of manipulation. An
experiment can subject two groups of pairs from the same
population to the two different types of manipulations described
here and compare the relative response ratios between the groups.
Previous studies suggest that parents of at least one bird species do
show different responses to different types of manipulations: Sanz
et al. [15] and Hinde [12] both manipulated pairs of great tits
(Parus major), but in different ways. In response to their
handicapping manipulation, Sanz et al. [15] documented a
compensation response, while Hinde [12], using playbacks of
begging calls, found that both parents increased their feeding
effort. These results are consistent with the perfect family model
and not with the almost perfect family, but they should be
replicated in the same population to minimize possible confound-
ing differences between populations.
It is also useful to compare our models to the work by
McNamara et al. [10] and Johnstone and Hinde [11]. McNamara
et al. stipulate that parents use genetically fixed, linear response
rules which they predict to have negative slopes, corresponding to
compensation responses. Johnstone and Hinde [11], in a model
motivated in part by the matching response found by Hinde [12],
show that the slope of the evolutionarily stable linear response rule
can also be positive. The main ingredient in their model is
uncertainty about the brood’s real need, which generates
evolutionarily stable response rules that under some parameter
values prescribe matching behavior. Thus, the linear response rule
approach also predict both matching and compensation by the
parents, depending on the parameters describing parents’
information about the brood’s need. A prominent feature of these
models is that the linear response rules are genetically fixed,
meaning that a species that has evolved a positively sloped
response rule will always respond to manipulations by a matching
response (although the absolute direction might vary, e.g. parents
might both decrease or increase their effort). This is very similar to
what the almost perfect family predicts, and the underlying reason
is the same in both cases: parents in both our almost perfect family
and in the linear response rule model only react to changes in their
partner’s behavior. In other words, these models exclude
communication between parents other than through changing
efforts or allocations, whereas the perfect family model allows
direct communication about the manipulation. Thus, the perfect
family model also stands as an alternative to the response rule
models [10,11], and can be distinguished from them using the
same empirical methodology described above.
To summarize, our goal in this paper was to present a model of
behavioral decision making by parents that can explain the varied
results from experimental studies that manipulate parents. Our
model predicts the type of response as a function of the nest
production function that encapsulates the information about the
breeding ecology, and the type of manipulation carried out. We
assume that parents have common behavioral objectives when
making time allocation decisions in the nest, and show that given a
trade-off between different parental tasks, varied responses of
parents can be explained under this assumption. We suggest that
future theoretical and empirical work should address the issue of
whether parents have concordant or conflicting interests when
making decisions at the nest. We provide two qualitatively
different models for how the pair might act, and suggest a way
in which these two models can be distinguished empirically. We
hope that our model will renew interest on the diversity of ways in
which parents make decisions and interact with each other.
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